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Abstract—Goppa Codes are a well-known class of codes
with, among others, applications in code-based cryptography.
In this paper, we present a collaborative decoding algorithm for
interleaved Goppa codes (IGC). Collaborative decoding increases
the decoding radius beyond half of the designed minimum
distance. We consider wild Goppa codes and show that we
can collaboratively correct more errors for binary Goppa codes
than the Patterson decoder. We propose a modified version of
the McEliece cryptosystem using wild IGC based on a recently
proposed system by Elleuch et al., analyze attacks on the system
and present some parameters with the corresponding key sizes.
Index Terms—Interleaved Goppa codes, decoding, public-key
cryptosystem, code-based cryptography, McEliece system
I. INTRODUCTION
Goppa codes [1] are a subclass of algebraic error-correcting
codes called alternant codes [2, Chapter 12], which are sub-
field subcodes of generalized Reed–Solomon (RS) codes [3].
Therefore, every Goppa code of length n over Fq is a
subfield subcode of a generalized RS code in Fnqm and can
be decoded with any RS decoder. Alternatively, Goppa codes
can be decoded by code specific algorithms, e.g., by solving
a key equation with the Euclidean algorithm [4]. Patterson [5]
introduced an algorithm with an extra “key equation degree
reduction” step, which increases the decoding radius of binary
Goppa codes. Barreto et al. [6] introduced a probabilistic
algorithm which generalizes Patterson’s algorithm over any
prime field Fp to increase the decoding radius of Goppa
codes from
⌊
r
2
⌋
to ⌊ 2
p
r⌋. Moreover, several list decoding
approaches [7]–[9] were proposed in order to decode Goppa
codes beyond half the designed minimum distance.
Interleaved RS codes can be decoded almost up to the
Singleton bound by collaborative decoding [10]. Since inter-
leaved Goppa codes are subcodes of interleaved RS codes,
they can be decoded by any collaborative RS decoder. As
an alternative, we present in this work the first collaborative
decoder specifically for interleaved Goppa codes.
In the second part of this work we consider the application
of Goppa codes in code-based cryptography. The threat of
quantum computers to the security of currently used public-
key cryptosystems sparked an increased interest in post-
quantum secure cryptosystems. One promising approach are
code-based cryptosystems, such as the McEliece cryptosys-
tem [11]. Besides being post-quantum secure, it also provides
faster encryption and decryption than conventional public-
key systems because algebraic error correcting codes offer
efficient encoding and decoding algorithms. The downside of
the McEliece cryptosystem is that for a given security level
the key size is significantly larger than for currently used
cryptosystems (e.g., for 128 bits security level, the key size
of the original McEliece system is several hundred KB and
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for RSA < 1 KB). This security level of the system depends
heavily on the chosen code and several classes of codes have
been proposed to decrease the key size. However, only Goppa
codes have remained secure for a long time.
In this work we introduce a new decoder for interleaved
Goppa codes, based on Patterson’s key equation [5]. Further,
we propose a repair and improvement of the interleaved
McEliece scheme of [12] to secure the system against Tillich’s
attack [13] and present parameters for different security levels.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Let Fq be a finite field of size q. Denote by a ∈ F
n
q a
vector of length n over Fq and by A ∈ F
a×b
q a matrix with a
rows and b columns over Fq . We denote the Hamming weight
of a vector a by wt(a) and the number of non-zero columns
of A by wt(A). A linear code C of length n, dimension k
and minimum distance d over Fq is denoted by [n, k, d]q or
[n, k]q.
B. Goppa Codes
A Goppa code [1] (see also [2]) is defined by a locator set
L and a Goppa polynomial g(x).
Definition 1 (Goppa Code). Let q be a prime power and
m,n, r be some integers such that rm ≤ n ≤ qm. Let L =
{α0, . . . , αn−1} be a set of n distinct elements of Fqm and
g(x) ∈ Fqm [x] be a polynomial of degree r such that g(αi) 6=
0, ∀αi ∈ L. The Goppa code Γ(L, g) is defined as
Γ(L, g) =
{
c
∣∣∣ n−1∑
i=0
ci
x− αi
≡ 0 mod g(x), ∀c ∈ Fnq
}
.
If g(x) has no multiple irreducible factors then Γ(L, g) is
called a square-free or separable Goppa code. In addition,
if g(x) is an irreducible polynomial then Γ(L, g) is called
an irreducible Goppa code. A Goppa code Γ(L, g) as in
Definition 1 is a linear code over Fq of length n = |L|,
dimension k ≥ n−mr and minimum distance d ≥ r+1. For
irreducible binary Goppa codes the distance is d ≥ 2r + 1.
It is well-known that Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of
[n, n− r]qm generalized RS codes.
C. Wild Goppa Codes
Wild Goppa codes [14] are a subclass of Goppa codes and
have been suggested for the Wild McEliece [15].
Definition 2 (Wild Goppa Codes). Let Γ(L, g) be as in
Definition 1. If b(x) is a monic square-free polynomial in
Fqm [x], the Goppa codes Γ(L, b
q) and Γ(L, bq−1) are called
wild Goppa codes.
It has been shown in [14] that the wild Goppa codes
Γ(L, bq) and Γ(L, bq−1) are the same code of length |L| = n,
dimension k ≥ n − rm and distance d ≥ q
q−1r + 1,
where r = deg(b(x)q−1) .
Remark (Binary square-free Goppa codes). The well-known
binary square-free Goppa codes of minimum distance d ≥
2r + 1 are a subclass of wild Goppa codes.
D. Interleaved Goppa Codes
Definition 3 (Interleaved Goppa Codes). Let Γ(L, g) be a
Goppa code as in Definition 1. An ℓ-interleaved Goppa code
(IGC) IΓ(L, g, ℓ) is defined as
IΓ(L, g, ℓ) =

C=


c(1)
...
c
(ℓ)

,∀c(i)∈ Γ(L, g), i = 1, . . . , ℓ

.
The advantage of interleaved codes is that if the errors
occur in the same positions in all rows, e.g., because of burst
errors on the channel, collaborative decoding of the rows
can increase the decoding radius beyond half the (designed)
minimum distance. Let R = C + E be the received word,
where C ∈ IΓ(L, g, ℓ) is a codeword and E ∈ Fℓ×nq is an
error matrix. By E , we denote the set of indices of the non-
zero columns of the error matrix E = [eij ]. The number of
(burst) errors is thus given by t = wt(E) := |E|.
III. DECODING OF INTERLEAVED WILD GOPPA CODES
In the following, we only consider interleaved codes that
arise from wild Goppa codes, i.e., g(x) = b(x)q for some
square-free polynomial b(x) in Fqm [x]. Recall that r := (q−
1) deg b(x) = q−1
q
deg g(x) (e.g., r = deg b(x) = deg g(x)2 for
q = 2).
A. Interleaving Patterson’s Key Equation
We present a decoder for interleaved wild Goppa codes
based on Patterson’s decoder [5]. The decoder solves a system
of key equations which contains the following polynomials.
Definition 4. Let R = [rij ], E = [eij ], and E be defined
as above. For i = 1, . . . , ℓ, we define the error locator Λ(x),
the ith error evaluator Ωi(x) and the i
th syndrome Si(x)
polynomials as follows,
Λ(x) :=
∏
j∈E
(x− αj) ,
Ωi(x) :=
∑
j∈E
eij
∏
µ∈E\{j}
(x− αµ) ,
Si(x) :=
n−1∑
j=0
rij
x− αj
≡
∑
j∈E
eij
x− αj
mod g(x) .
The goal of the decoder is to find the unknown error
locator and evaluator polynomials from the known syndrome
polynomials such that they fulfill the following relation.
Theorem 1 (System of Key Equations).
Ωi(x) ≡ Λ(x)Si(x) mod g(x) ,
degΩi(x) < degΛ(x) = |E|
for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
Proof. This congruence relations and inequalities follow di-
rectly from the definition.
Theorem 1 assumes the specific structure of Ωi(x) and
Λ(x) given in Definition 4, which makes direct solving of
the key equations a non-linear problem. Instead, we solve the
following linearized, well-studied, version of the problem.
Problem 1. Given g(x), S1(x), . . . , Sℓ(x) ∈ Fqm [x], find
λ(x), ω1(x), . . . , ωℓ(x) ∈ Fqm [x], not all zero, such that
ωi(x) ≡ λ(x)Si(x) mod g(x) , (1)
degωi(x) < degλ(x) , (2)
degλ(x) minimal . (3)
Remark. Problem 1 is well-studied in literature, see the
overview and relation to several decoding problems in [16],
[17]. A solution of the problem can be found in
O
(
ℓ3r log2(r) log(log(r))
)
over Fqm , see [16] (note that deg g(x) =
q
q−1r ∈ O(r)).
For ℓ = 1, we can prove that the solution of Problem 1
agrees with the actual error locator and error evaluator poly-
nomial up to a scalar factor, for up to q
q−1 ·
r
2 errors.
Theorem 2. Let ℓ = 1 and |E| ≤ q
q−1 ·
r
2 . Let λ(x), ω1(x) ∈
Fqm [x] be a solution of Problem 1 with input g(x), S1(x).
Then, the solution fulfills
λ(x) = c · Λ(x) and ω1(x) = c · Ω1(x)
for some non-zero constant c ∈ Fqm .
Proof. The proof works similar to [18, Proposition 6.1]. We
have g(αi) 6= 0 for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1, so (x − αi) ∤ g(x),
and gcd(Λ(x), g(x)) = 1. Hence, the inverse of Λ(x) modulo
g(x) exists and we can rewrite the key equation into
Λ−1(x)Ωi(x) ≡ Si(x) mod g(x) .
By (1), we obtain ωi(x) ≡ λ(x)Λ
−1(x)Ωi(x) mod g(x), so
ωi(x)Λ(x) ≡ λ(x)Ωi(x) mod g(x) . (4)
By definition, the degrees of both sides of the congruence are
< 2|E| ≤ q
q−1 · r = deg g(x) ,
so we can omit the modulo operation. Hence,
ωi(x)Λ(x) = λ(x)Ωi(x) . (5)
Furthermore, for ℓ = 1, we have Ω1(αi) 6= 0 for all i ∈ E .
Hence, (x − αi) ∤ Ω1(x) and gcd(Ω1(x),Λ(x)) = 1. By
(5), we must have Λ(x) | λ(x). Since Λ(x) and Ω1(x)
satisfy conditions (1) and (2), and λ(x) is of minimal degree
satisfying the conditions, we must have deg λ(x) ≤ degΛ(x).
Hence,
λ(x) = c · Λ(x) (6)
for some non-zero scalar c ∈ Fqm . We obtain ω1(x) = c ·
Ω1(x) from (5).
Remark. For ℓ = 1, the system of key equations in Theorem 1
is equivalent to Patterson’s key equation [5, Equation (3)]
with g(x) = b(x)q−1 instead of g(x) = b(x)q . Since we use
wild Goppa codes here, where Γ(L, b(x)q−1) = Γ(L, b(x)q),
we can circumvent the “reduction step” in Patterson’s de-
coder [5, Algorithm 4] and directly decode up to q
q−1 ·
r
2 errors
uniquely. This enables us to “interleave” our key equation
which is not possible with the “reduced key equation” in [5,
Section V]. Furthermore, for q > 3, we can decode more
errors than the algorithm in [6] uniquely. Note that both
decoders are probabilistic and similar to [6] we have to
rely on simulation results to determine the decoding failure
probability (see Section III-B).
By counting the number of unknowns (coefficients of λ(x)
and ωi(x)) and equations of the linear system given by the
coefficients of the left- and right-hand side of the congruence
relation, one can see that Problem 1 can only have a unique
minimal solution with
λ(x) = c · Λ(x) and ωi(x) = c · Ωi(x) (7)
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Figure 1. Probability of decoding failure of an [127, 85,≥ 13]2 (unique
decoding radius = 6) wild IGC for ℓ = 2 and ℓ = 5 compared to the
bound from [10] on probability of decoding failure of the corresponding IRS
supercode in F
27
. For each point > 2000 iterations were performed.
for some non-zero scalar c ∈ Fqm for all i if
|E| ≤
ℓ
ℓ+ 1
·
q
q − 1
· r =: tmax . (8)
Our simulation results indicate that below this maximal de-
coding radius, most of the error matrices E of weight at
most wt(E) = tmax can be decoded by our algorithm (i.e.,
any solution of Problem 1 fulfills (7)). More precisely, the
results indicate that the number of error patterns for which
decoding fails or miscorrects decreases exponentially in the
value tmax − t, where t is the actual number of errors.
Remark. As an alternative to the decoder presented above,
we can directly decode in an interleaved variant of the GRS
supercode of the used Goppa code (with minimum distance
deg g(x)). We can use all known decoding algorithms for
these interleaved codes, e.g., [10], [19], [20] (or the more
advanced algorithms in [21]–[25], which we will not consider
in this paper). The algorithms in [10], [19], [20] yield the
same maximal decoding radius as the interleaved Patterson
decoder described above.
B. Simulation Results
Since the interleaved decoding radius exceeds the unique
decoding radius, decoding fails with a certain probability. For
interleaved RS codes an upper bound on the probability of
decoding failure was derived in [10]. However, even though
interleaved Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of interleaved
generalized RS codes, this bound does not hold for the former,
as it assumes random error patterns from Fqm , while the error
patterns in the case of interleaved Goppa codes are only from
the subfield Fq. A bound for interleaved subfield subcodes
is an open problem left for future work and we rely on
simulation results to support our conjecture that decoding will
succeed with high probability.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for an [127, 85,≥
13]2 wild IGC for ℓ = 2 and ℓ = 5. As it is well known that
the rank of the error matrix is related to the failure probability
(see, e.g., [26]), the probability of decoding failure for full-
rank error matrices is also shown. The results confirm that
the bound of [10] does not hold for subfield subcodes, as it
is clearly exceeded by the probability of decoding failure of
the IGC, regardless of the rank of the error matrix. However,
the seemingly exponential decay in probability of decoding
failure supports our conjecture.
C. ℓ-Interleaved Subfield Subcodes in Fq vs. Codes in Fqℓ
Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of RS codes in Fqm
and can be constructed over any field Fqγ with γ | m. We
first consider the case q > 2. An ℓ-interleaved Goppa code
CIΓ over Fq with rIΓ = deg(gIΓ(x)) is of rate RIΓ ≈
n−rIΓm
n
and each codeword is of length ℓn over Fq. For ℓ|m, a Goppa
code CΓ with Goppa polynomial gΓ(x) over Fqℓ is of rate
RΓ ≈
n−rΓ
m
ℓ
n
and has codeword size n logq q
ℓ = ℓn over Fq .
To obtain the same rate for both codes, i.e., RΓ = RIΓ, the
degree rΓ of gΓ(x) has to be chosen as
n− rΓ
m
ℓ
n
=
n− rIΓm
n
⇒ rΓ = ℓrIΓ .
For appropriately chosen Goppa polynomials the distances of
the codes are dIΓ = rIΓ + 1 and dΓ = rΓ + 1 = ℓrIΓ +
1 respectively. Comparing the decoding radii for interleaved
decoding of CIΓ and bounded minimum distance decoding of
CΓ gives tIΓ =
ℓ
ℓ+1(dIΓ − 1) >
dΓ−1
2 = tΓ, which implies
ℓ < 1. It follows that, in general, the decoding radius of an ℓ-
interleaved Goppa code is not larger than the unique decoding
radius of the corresponding code over a larger field with the
same codeword size and code rate. The only exception are
ℓ = 2 interleaved binary Goppa codes with square-free Goppa
polynomial. These Goppa codes are of distance dIΓ = 2rIΓ+1
and hence the radius is increased for ℓ < 3.
It follows that if the sole motivation of interleaving is
increasing the decoding radius regardless of the size of the
generator and parity check matrix, it is generally advantageous
to use a Goppa code over Fqℓ instead of ℓ-interleaving a
Goppa code over Fq, with the exception of q = ℓ = 2.
However, as we will see in the next section, interleaved Goppa
codes do have an application in code-based cryptography.
IV. APPLICATION: IMPROVEMENT AND REPARATION OF A
CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON INTERLEAVED GOPPA CODES
Recently, [12] proposed a variant of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem based on interleaved Goppa codes. The idea is
that the public key is an obfuscated generator matrix of a
Goppa code and the ciphertext is a corrupted codeword of
a corresponding interleaved code. Since the interleaved code
can correct more (burst) errors than the original code, the
level of security against generic decoding (e.g., information-
set decoding), which usually determines the security level, is
increased. On the other hand, structural attacks remain as hard
as on the original Goppa-code-based system. Hence, smaller
key sizes than in the original McEliece cryptosystem can be
achieved. We modify the new system by using wild Goppa
codes, which further increase the decoding radius. We also
consider several attacks and propose a repair method and
restrictions on parameters to avoid the attacks.
A. System Description
Alice generates the key pair: public key (Gpub, tpub, ℓ)
and private key (S,P ,D), where D is an efficient decoder
for the ℓ-interleaved wild Goppa code with generator matrix
G = S−1GpubP
−1 ∈ Fk×nq correcting up to tpub = tmax =
ℓ
ℓ+1 ·
q
q−1 · r errors.
Bob encrypts the secret message M ∈ Fℓ×kq into a
ciphertext Y ∈ Fℓ×nq by Y = MGpub+E, where E ∈ F
ℓ×n
q
is a full-rank random matrix with tpub non-zero columns.
Alice retrieves the secret messages by Mˆ = D(Y P−1)S−1.
B. Decoding Attacks
1) Finding the Low-Weight Codewords Attack: Consider
the following three codes
C := 〈Gpub〉 , C
′ :=
〈[
Gpub
Y
]〉
, and CE := 〈E〉 .
Obviously, C′ = C+CE since we can perform row operations
to get [
Gpub
Y
]
∼
[
Gpub
E
]
.
Hence, we have d(C′) ≤ d(CE) =: dE. Finding several words
of weight dE in C
′ might reveal error positions, thereby
allowing information set decoding attacks (ISD) with less
error positions. Assuming the worst case, i.e., all found words
of weight dE belong to CE and the union of their support is
the set of error positions, this gives an attack whose work
factor is determined by algorithms for finding codewords of
weight dE in a linear code.
Note that we can only guarantee d(C′) ≤ dE. In principle,
there might be codewords in C′ of smaller weight. Such
codewords would always be of the form c = a + b, where
a ∈ C \ {0}, b ∈ CE \ {0}, and wt(a) < dE + tpub. Hence,
the probability that such codewords exist depends on the
weight distributions of the codes C and CE (e.g., how many
codewords a of weight wt(a) < dE+tpub exist). Furthermore,
even if such words c exist and are found by an attack, it
needs to be studied whether c would reveal some of the error
positions. Note that this is a general problem of any McEliece
system correcting beyond the unique decoding radius, e.g.,
through list decoding [27], [28].
2) Finding the Support of the Subcode Attack: Tillich
pointed out in [13] that since the code CE[n, ℓ] is a subcode
of C′[n, k + ℓ] and |supp(CE)| = tpub, where supp(CE) =
{i ; ∃c ∈ CE, ci 6= 0}, one can reveal the error positions
by finding supp(CE). This problem has been studied by
Otmani and Tillich for the binary case in [29], which gives
a very efficient attack if the parameter p chosen to fulfill
2p ≥ dGV (
tpub−ℓ
n−ℓ (k + ℓ + l), ℓ) is small for some integer l
(e.g., [29] gives 1 ≤ p ≤ 4 as a typical range for p). For
the parameters presented in Table I this is not the case and
the complexity of this attack is far from causing a security
bottleneck. However, this attack needs to be considered when
choosing the system parameters.
C. Repair
Our repair is based on the idea of choosing the rows of the
error matrix E as the basis of a code with large minimum
distance dE. The rows of E have to be chosen to be linearly
independent to prevent brute-forcing linear combinations of
the rows of Y , resulting in error-free linear combinations of
the codewords (i.e., rows of Y −E), which might reveal part
of the message.
Since E has only tpub non-zero columns, we choose the
submatrix E′ of E, consisting of these columns, to be a
generator matrix of a code with parameters
C′E[tpub, ℓ, dE] := 〈E
′〉.
Thus, the overall error code CE has parameters [n, ℓ, dE]q .
Remark. Note that since the code C′E is required to have
specific properties, it might have to be considered public,
e.g., if there are only few known constructions for the desired
dE. Then revealing the error positions in Y is equivalent
to determining the permutational equivalence of CE and a
subcode of C′, which has been shown to be an NP-complete
problem [30]. Nevertheless it needs to be studied if this
could lead to a more efficient attack than finding low weight
codewords. To avoid this kind of attack it is also possible to
choose CE at random from some large family of codes.
D. Measure of Security Level (SL)
To determine the SL of the original McEliece cryptosystem
and our system (see Table I), we use the currently fastest
algorithm over arbitrary Fq presented in [31]. Another recent
algorithm [32] might yield smaller security levels but that
needs to be further verified. Both algorithms are generaliza-
tions of several important improvements of information-set
decoding attacks since 2011: [33] for [31] and [34]–[38] for
[32]. The SL of our repaired system is calculated with dE
rather than tpub, since any non-trivial linear combination of the
received words (rows of the received matrix Y ) are codewords
corrupted by errors of weight at least dE.
E. Parameter Choice
In order to improve upon the original or Wild McEliece
system, the work factor ISD [32] must be larger than the one
of generic decoding of the original system. Neglecting the
difference in dimension (k compared to k+ ℓ), this condition
translates to
dE >
⌊
1
2
·
q
q − 1
r
⌋
. (9)
In the following, we analyze for which parameters q, ℓ and r
such a linear code C′E exists. We start with the negative result
that there is no improvement for q = 2.
Theorem 3. For q = 2, the work factor cannot be increased
by interleaving.
Proof. With (8) and (9) we get
tpub <
2ℓ
ℓ+ 1
dE .
as a necessary condition for an improvement compared to
the original McEliece cryptosystem in terms of the code
parameters of C′E[tpub, ℓ, dE]. By the Griesmer bound [39] the
relation
tpub ≥
ℓ−1∑
i=0
⌈
dE
2i
⌉
≥
ℓ−1∑
i=0
dE
2i
= dE(2− 2
−(ℓ−1))
holds and it follows that there can only be an improvement if
tpub <
2ℓ
ℓ+ 1
dE ≤
2ℓ
(ℓ+ 1)(2 − 2−(ℓ−1))
tpub
⇔ 1 <
ℓ
(ℓ+ 1)(1 − 2−ℓ)
2ℓ < ℓ+ 1 ,
which is only the case for ℓ = 1.
Larger fields, q > 2, provide more flexibility in the code
parameters. For q ≥ tpub, we can even achieve dE =
tpub − ℓ + 1 (which is the maximal possible dE due to the
Singleton bound) using an MDS code, but also for smaller
field sizes there are codes with sufficiently large minimum
distance dE. For large tpub, we could use asymptotically good
sequences of codes, e.g., AG codes [40] over small fields. For
small values of tpub, we can use tables of good codes, e.g.,
CodeTables [41]. For instance:
• For parameters q = 3, ℓ = 7 and tpub = 110 there is
a [110, 7, dE = 70]3 code, while the unique decoding
radius for these parameters is
⌊
1
2 ·
q
q−1r
⌋
= 63.
• For parameters q = 4, ℓ = 9 and tpub = 266 there is
a [266, 9, dE = 195]4 code, while the unique decoding
radius for these parameters is
⌊
1
2 ·
q
q−1r
⌋
= 148.
It is notable that the used code is only required to have good
code parameters, but we do not need an efficient decoding
algorithm.
Remark. Apart from the decoding attacks mentioned in IV-B,
the chosen Goppa code has to resist structural attacks, i.e.,
attacks that recover the secret key from the public gener-
ator matrix, such as the attack on certain quadratic wild
Goppa codes [42] or a potential attack resulting from the
distinguisher on high-rate Goppa codes [43]. Similar to the
original McEliece system, the public generator matrix of the
interleaved system is a generator matrix of a Goppa code,
hence the same considerations apply.
F. Key Size of repaired interleaved McEliece
Table I compares the (n, k, t) Wild McEliece and our pro-
posed repaired ℓ-interleaved (n, k, tpub) McEliece for typical
SL (i.e., 128, 256 bits) in terms of the key size.
For each parameter set we compute the size of the public
key in systematic form as k(n − k) bits. Note that we as-
sume appropriate padding and randomizing (so-called CCA2-
conversion) that protects against semantic attacks, i.e., attacks
where the plaintext is obtained from the systematic part.
SL
q m Method r n k
t
Rate
Key size
[bits] (ℓ, tpub, dE) [Bytes]
128
2 12 U. D. 70 2800 1960 70 0.70 205 800
3 8
U. D.
100
2420 1620 75 0.67 256 763
Int. 2130 1330 (7, 131, 84) 0.62 210 800
4 6
U. D.
90
2150 1610 60 0.75 217 350
Int. 1580 1040 (7, 105, 76) 0.66 140 400
5 5
U. D.
100
1800 1380 62 0.74 200 266
Int. 1290 790 (7, 109, 84) 0.61 114 646
256
2 13 U. D. 120 6740 5180 120 0.77 1 010 100
3 8
U. D.
180
5100 3660 135 0.72 1 044 173
Int. 4300 2860 (7, 236, 156) 0.67 815 939
4 7
U. D.
240
4880 3200 160 0.66 1 344 000
Int. 3760 2080 (7, 280, 208) 0.55 873 600
5 6
U. D.
200
4690 3490 125 0.74 1 215 530
Int. 3200 2000 (7, 218, 171) 0.63 696 578
U.D. = Unique Decoding [11], [15]. Int. = Interleaved Decoding (this paper).
Table I
KEY SIZE OF REPAIRED INTERLEAVED MCELIECE AND WILD MCELIECE
FOR 128 AND 256-BITS SECURITY LEVEL (DETERMINED BY ISD
ALGORITHM OVER Fq [31]).
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